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Abstract
We consider a market where firms hire workers to run their projects and such
projects differ in profitability. At any period, each firm needs two workers to suc-
cessfully run its project: a junior agent, with no specific skills, and a senior worker,
whose effort is not verifiable. Senior workers differ in ability and their competence
is revealed after they have worked as juniors in the market. We study the length of
the contractual relationships between firms and workers in an environment where
the matching between firms and workers is the result of market interaction. We
show that, despite in a one-firm-one-worker set-up long-term contracts are the op-
timal choice for firms, market forces often induce firms to use short-term contracts.
Unless the market only consists of firms with very profitable projects, firms oper-
ating highly profitable projects offer short-term contracts to ensure the service of
high-ability workers and those with less lucrative projects also use short-term con-
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tracts to save on the junior workers’ wage. Intermediate firms may (or may not)
hire workers through long-term contracts.
JEL numbers: D86, C78
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1 Introduction
Partners may establish relationships that last for several periods. In job contracts, for
instance, some firms hire the same worker for several years with a long-term contract,
while others may prefer to sign contracts period by period, sometimes with the same
worker, sometimes with different workers over time. One question that arises is when is
it better for the employer to write a long-term contract that covers the whole length of
the relationship and when is a short-term contract signed for a certain period of time
superior, knowing that once that period is over the firm has to offer another short-term
contract.
The contributions by Lambert (1983), Rogerson (1985), Malcomson and Spinnewyn
(1988), and Chiappori et al. (1994), among others, address the previous question in
settings characterized by moral hazard where one firm (the principal) enters into a long-
lasting relationship with a worker (the agent). In these settings, if the firm and the agent
can commit to a long-term contract, the firm can design a long-term agreement that
dominates the sequence of optimal short-term contracts. In fact, long-term contracts can
always replicate the sequence of the optimal short-term contracts while the reverse is, in
general, not possible. This result is robust to a number of different specifications and
implies that, if commitment on the part of the participants is possible, we should expect
firms to use mainly long-term contracts in practice.1 However, this is not the case and
the fact that different firms in similar markets follow different time-duration contracts
suggests that there may be other explanations beyond lack of commitment.
In this paper we argue that not all the characteristics of the optimal contract between
an employer and a worker can be deduced from the analysis of this relationship in a
one-worker, one-firm setting. As the recent contributions by Dam and Pérez-Castrillo
(2006), Serfes (2008), Terviö (2008) and Alonso-Paulí and Pérez-Castrillo (forthcoming)
have shown, when the analysis is enlarged to take into consideration market interaction,
then the form of the optimal contracts may substantially differ from the agreements that
one obtains for a given relationship studied in isolation. When heterogenous principals
1When commitment on the agent side is difficult, contracts may include, for example, non-compete
clauses under which the agent agrees not to pursue a similar profession or trade in a firm in the same
industry if he breaks the contract. Contracts may also include other clauses that will reduce mobility by
increasing the cost of hiring the worker by another firm.
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compete for heterogenous agents, the identity of the partners in each relationship (in
addition to the contract signed) is endogenous, as it is the level of utility obtained by
the agents. Hence, even if short-term contracts are not optimal when we consider an
isolated relationship, they may arise as part of the market equilibrium where some firms
may choose long-term contracts while other hire workers only on short-term agreements.
We consider a market where heterogenous firms hire workers to run their projects.
Firms differ in the profitability of their project. At any period, each firm needs two types
of workers: a junior agent, with no specific skills, and a senior experienced, worker whose
expertise is crucial for the good development of the project. Every worker starts as a
junior agent in the first period he works in a firm. At this point in their lives, all workers
are identical. After the period as an apprentice, the worker becomes senior for the second,
and final, period of his job career. In our model, the first period has a training component:
workers acquire the knowledge and experience needed to run a project when seniors. We
assume that this period gives human capital specific to the industry. This allows any
worker that was hired (and trained) by a firm as a junior to run a project as a senior in
any firm of the market.2
The model is dynamic not only because the relationships (may) involve several peri-
ods, but also because information about workers’ characteristics changes over time: after
the agent has worked for a firm as a junior, the firms and the worker himself learn his
competence as senior, which was ex-ante unknown for all market participants. Therefore,
while all junior workers are indistinguishable, this is not the case for senior workers as not
only their responsibilities (the project they work on), but also their abilities may be quite
different. Consequently, we model a very simple technology of training that combines two
dimensions of learning. First, there is learning because the innate ability of the worker is
revealed through his training as a junior and this information becomes common knowl-
edge for the industry. Second, there is a learning-by-doing component since working as
junior is a prerequisite to later running a project as a senior. In this respect, the paper is
related, though different, to the literature on on-the-job talent discovery. Terviö (2009)
also presents a situation where workers’ innate ability is unknown for the market (and
2In other words, we do not deal with firm-specific training in the model. If there is some firm-specific
ability, workers who change jobs in the second period of their lives lose their firm-specific human capital
and just keep their general training in the industry. This will tend to decrease the profitability of short-
term contracts.
4
the workers themselves) until they actually work for a firm. However, in Terviö’s paper
the objective is different as he is concerned by the possiblity that market imperfections
hamper the process of discovering talent.
In the model, a moral hazard problem is present as senior workers’ effort or decision is
not contractible. On the contrary, and just for simplicity, we consider juniors’ effort to be
contractible. All the participants are risk neutral and they all have the capacity to commit
to a long-term contract.3 However, workers are protected by limited liability: their salary
when junior and their salary when senior cannot be lower than certain thresholds.
We characterize equilibria in this market, which accounts for the type of contract
offered by each firm and the characteristics of these contracts. Our equilibrium concept is
close to the idea of “stability” used in the matching literature that has analyzed contracts
in environments where the matching between firms and workers is endogenous.4 To be
an equilibrium, an outcome (that is, a matching and a set of contracts) must be immune
to deviations. In our environment, at equilibrium, it must be the case that a firm cannot
make more profit by changing its strategy, that is, by offering contracts to workers that
make both the firm and the workers better-off than before.
We first show that firms signing equilibrium long-term contracts offer low salaries to
junior workers together with the promise of high reward when senior. This allows the firms
to alleviate the incentive problem they face with senior agents, improving the efficiency of
the relationship and also their profits. Since they commit to do so, these firms will keep
the agents when senior, irrespective of their ability. Firms that sign short-term contracts
hire junior agents with no promise of continuation. They also sign short-term contracts
with senior workers (who may or may not be the same they hired the previous period as
juniors); the terms of the agreement may depend on the workers’ ability level.
We have already argued that the optimal long-term contract always (at least weakly)
3If no participant can commit to a long-term contract, then all must be short-term contracts. If the
participants in one of the sides of the market, say the firms, can commit while the others cannot, then
there can still be room for long-term contracts, but they are typically less efficient than in the environment
with full commitment. In terms of the commitment possibilities, we place ourselves in the best scenario
for the prevalence of long-term contracts.
4Stability and competitive equilibrium are very close concepts. Any stable outcome is also a compet-
itive equilibrium and vice-versa. For (early) matching models where the parties decide on money instead
of contracts see, for instance, the original contribution by Shapley and Shubik (1972), and the excellent
review of the literature by Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
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dominates any sequence of short-term contracts when the identity of the parties matched
in a job contract is predetermined. However, short-term contracts can be beneficial for
firms when the firm-worker matching is endogenous. Short-term contracts allow the
firms to screen workers before putting them in charge of leading a project. This non-
commitment strategy gives firms the freedom to focus on the particular type of senior
worker that fits their needs. Therefore, firms face a trade-off between choosing the op-
timal contract for a given match (long-term are superior to short-term agreements) and
selecting a contract that allows a better selection (hiring high-ability senior workers is
more important for some firms than for others).
The market equilibrium depends on the characteristics of the set of firms and the set
of workers. We solve the model for markets where there is a large proportion of low-
productivity (normal) senior workers and a small proportion of high-productivity senior
workers (stars) and where these highly-talented workers really make a difference in the
firms they work for.
When only firms with very profitable projects exist in the market, all of them sign
long-term contracts at equilibrium. Each firm offers the same agreement that it would
offer if no market would have existed. More interestingly, we show that, except in this
case where the market only consists of firms with very profitable projects, there is always
a set of firms that sign short-term contracts with their junior workers and specialize in
a particular type of seniors. Depending on the value they attach to their projects, some
firms always look for high-ability while others hire low-ability senior workers. Firms with
highly profitable projects give a great deal of relevance to hiring high-ability senior agents
to run their projects and, hence, they are willing to offer high wages to attract them.
As a result, the expected utility of junior workers when they accept short-term contracts
becomes higher because, if they turn out to be of high ability, they will obtain a high
reward when senior. The expectation of this potential reward leads workers to accept,
when junior, a low wage. Firms with relatively poor projects take advantage of this
reduction in the wage of junior workers. These firms put more weight on the savings on
juniors’ wages than to the fact that they end up contracting with a low-ability senior
worker. Therefore, at equilibrium, the firms with the most profitable projects use short-
term contracts to ensure the services of high-ability workers while the firms with the least
profitable projects use short-term contracts to save in the cost of hiring junior workers.
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In this sense, the matching between firms and senior agents is positive assortative, for the
sets that choose short-term contracts.5
The trade-off between the advantages of long-term and short-term contracts is often
solved in favor of the use of long-term contracts for firms with intermediate projects. The
likelihood of the coexistence of the two types of contracts is higher as the distribution
of firms is more biased toward good projects, the discount rate is lower, the difference
between the reservation utility of junior workers and the minimum salary is lower, the
difference in performance between high and low-ability senior workers is higher, and the
cost of the workers’ effort is lower.
Workers receive part of the increased surplus created by the optimal sorting of senior
workers promoted by the short-term agreements. Indeed, although all junior workers are
identical and they perform identical tasks, those who sign short-term contracts expect a
higher utility than those signing long-term contracts. Long-term agreements allow the
firms to avoid the competition for the best workers, who obtain high salaries under short-
term equilibrium contracts.
In our analysis, we focus on markets with a small proportion of very talented senior
workers that make a difference for the firms they work for and whose level of ability is pub-
lic for all the firms inside the industry. Moreover, the human capital acquired by seniors is
industry-specific and not just firm-specific. This model can provide a schematic version of
the university job market. The performance of researchers during the first years after the
completion of their Ph.D., that we can associate to their “ability”, is public information
since it can be measured, for instance, by their publication record. In this job-market
some universities offer Ph.D. graduates a tenure track position that guarantees tenure if,
after the probationary period, the candidate satisfies some predetermined performance
criteria (in terms of publications and other measures). The tenure-track system corre-
sponds in our model to short-term contracts. Other universities sign tenure contracts
from the very beginning and take the commitment of keeping the researcher independent
of the outcome of further evaluation (even if contract conditions may indeed depend on
performance). This corresponds to a long-term contract.
Arts and sports are also examples of markets where the ability of seniors is well-known,
5See Legros and Newman (2007) for conditions under which monotone matchings emerge in environ-
ments where utility is not fully transferable.
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as it is subject to public scrutiny through their performance and where this human capital
is mainly industry-specific. Singers or soccer players, for instance, may sign exclusive
contracts (with a studio, a record company, or a club) for a long period in which they are
prevented from recording an album for another company or playing with another club.
Other companies, however, choose to offer shorter contracts, particularly to young singers
or players. The stars of these markets, a few individuals, attain prominence and success
and their value and earnings are significantly greater than the earnings of the standard
worker in the markets. The same can be said about surgeons or creatives in advertising.
Finally, the market for upper executives also shares some similar features: these high
executives are well-known within their industry and their contracts may (or may not)
include special clauses aimed at preventing them from moving to another firm.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to study how the choice of the
contractual length may be determined by market interaction. There are other papers that
have studied the implications of different contractual arrangements but in widely different
set-ups. Rice and Sen (2008) show how a reduction in the length of a contract can help
to alleviate the moral hazard problem when explicit incentives cannot be included in the
terms of the contract. In their paper, the optimal choice for the principal depends on
the balance between more incentives for effort (short-term contracts) and lower wages
(long-term contracts).
The contribution by Ghosh and Waldman (2010) compares two contractual arrange-
ments: up-or-stay vs. up-or-out contracts in a setting with multiple firms competing for
a worker. The paper does not address the issue of endogenous matching since it studies
the firms’ Bertrand competition in wages to attract the single worker available in the
market. They show that up-or-out prevails when firm-specific human capital is low and
when high- and low-level jobs are similar. Otherwise, standard (up-or-stay) practices are
optimal. Similar to our paper, Ghatak et al. (2001) study an overlapping generations ver-
sion of a principal-agent problem where contracts are determined in general equilibrium.
In their model, all young workers are identical but have different investment possibilities
when senior, depending on their performance. They do not allow for long term contracts
because their the authors’ concern is to explain the seniors’ decision between becoming
entrepreneurs or remaining workers.
In our paper, short-term contracts act as a form of probationary period that allows
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firms and workers to achieve a better matching. It is, therefore, not a way in which firms
try to test if the worker is good enough for the job, but rather it allows senior workers
to be matched with those firms where they are more productive. In this sense, the short-
term contract serves as a sorting device. A related, but different, argument can be found
in Loh (1994) where it is argued that introducing an employment probation can serve as
a sorting device as it will induce self-selection by workers. Firms offering probationary
employment will tend to attract workers who are more confident about their capabilities.
Finally, the coexistence of fixed payment schemes and incentive-based payment schemes
related to the characteristic of the workers is also present in a static adverse selection
framework where firms compete for agents. Matutes et al. (1994) study the choice of
compensation schemes by two firms that compete in a labor market where agents are
heterogenous and they have private information about their type. They show that, in
equilibrium, if firms are not too different in the eyes of workers, one firm offers a wage
rate and the other offers a piece rate. By proposing different compensation schemes, firms
induce self-selection among workers, which thereby decreases the intensity of competition
in the labor market.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Sections 3, 4 and 5 analyze the candidate long-term and short-term contracts for equi-
librium. Section 6 characterizes the identity of the firms and workers that enter into the
relationship, the equilibrium salaries, as well as the contracts that emerge as a result of
the market interaction. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Model
We model the economy as an overlapping generation model where at each period , with
 = 1 2 , firms contract with workers to develop projects. Firms are infinite-lived players
and the set of firms is constant for all periods. On the other hand, workers (agents) live
for two periods. Both, firms and workers discount the future according to the discount
factor , where  ∈ (0 1).
All participants are assumed to be risk neutral. We also assume that a worker, at any
age, enjoys limited liability over income. This constraint implies that his wage in any
period and contingency cannot be lower than a certain threshold .
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At any period , each firm is endowed with a project. The revenue for the firm from
the project is  + if it is developed successfully, whereas it is   0 in case of failure. 
can be interpreted as a fixed component of the revenue that is not subject to uncertainty.
The additional value of the project in case of success, , is public information, it is the
same across periods for a given firm, but it varies across firms. It is distributed in the
interval
£¤, with   0, according to the distribution function (). Hence, the set
of firms can also be identified as the interval
£¤.6 We consider that the set of active
firms
£¤ and the distribution function () are given; we will discuss at the end of
the paper on these assumptions
Each period, a generation of workers is born. We assume that the measure of the set
of workers born at any period is larger than the measure of the set of firms. Therefore,
at period  the market is composed by the set of firms, the set of workers that enter the
market this period and the set of old workers that entered the market at period − 1. At
period 1 there is a set of workers who are already old.
To run its project, a firm needs to hire a non-specialized worker and a specialized
worker. Any agent is a non-specialized worker the first period he works in this market.
After this first job, a young agent that has worked for a firm becomes a specialized
worker; that is, working for a firm gives the agent the necessary skills to be in charge of a
project. We will also refer to non-specialized and specialized workers as junior and senior
agents, respectively.7 According to our assumptions, there are more junior workers than
non-specialized positions to fill in the market.
6We assume that each firm’s revenue is composed of a part () that depends on the success of the
venture and a fixed part ( ) that is independent of its success. In our model, all firms have the same 
while they are heterogeneous with respect to  so that a “good” firm is a firm with a high . However,
workers have no influence on  and decisions do not depend on  . Therefore, the analysis that we
develop is independent of whether  is the same for all the firms or if it varies from firm to firm. We can
assume an arbitrary function  () that associates a fixed revenue  to each variable revenue  and all
the results go through for this, more general, scenario. It could be the case, for example, that  () is
decreasing and that firms with a high  have lower expected profits than firms with low .
7Those agents who did not work for any firm when young could also be hired as non-specialized workers
when old. In other words, the time when working as a junior is both a probational and a forming period.
However, we will assume that they are no longer in the market. As it will become clear once we will
develop our analysis, this is just a simplification since no firm would prefer to hire an old-non-specialized
instead of a junior worker.
10
A senior agent only enters a relationship if his expected utility is at least equal to
some “outside utility” that we denote by . That is,  is the level of utility that a
senior agent can secure outside our economy, at any period. It can be understood as his
utility outside the labor market. Similarly, a junior agent only accepts a contract if his
expected intertemporal utility is at least  + .
All workers are identical when junior. However, when senior, agents may have different
abilities in this market. An agent’s ability to run a project as a senior is ex-ante unknown
to all players, including the agent himself. The ability becomes publicly known to all
players once the agent has worked for any firm, that is, when he is senior.
A junior agent working for a firm does a routine job and exerts a predetermined and
contractible level of effort.8 We normalize the cost for the agent of exerting this effort to
zero. If we denote by  the payment to the junior agent, then his utility at this age is
equal to  .
A senior agent working for a firm runs the project and his effort (decision) is crucial
to its good development. This specialized effort is not contractible (not verifiable) and
it influences the probability of success of the project. We assume that the probability
of success takes the form , where  is the senior agent’s effort and the parameter 
summarizes his ability.9 The ability  can take two values:  or  with   ;
that is, for the same effort   0, a high-ability senior agent has a higher probability of
success () than a low-ability senior agent (). As said above, it is only after being
employed as a junior worker that an agent’s ability is public knowledge. Ex-ante, there
is a proportion  of high-ability agents in the population.
The result of the project (success or failure) is verifiable and the agents’ payment
can depend on it. Given that the junior agent’s effort is verifiable, there is no reason to
offer him a contingent payment and a fixed salary  is optimal. On the other hand, a
contingent payment scheme should be offered to the senior agent to give him the right
incentives. We denote by  = (∆) such an incentive scheme, where the first com-
ponent of the contract,  is the base payment, i.e., the transfer in case of failure while
8The assumption that the junior agent’s effort is contractible provides a simple set-up. The main
conclusions of our analysis carry over a more complex model where the junior agent’s effort is subject to
moral hazard as long as the effort does not affect the learning of the worker’s ability (this possiblity is
considered for example in Holmstrom, 1999).
9We assume that the parameters of the model make sure that  is always smaller than 1.
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the second part, ∆ is the bonus in case revenue  is obtained. The contract offered
may be different depending on the (publicly known) ability of the senior worker, that is,
we may have  different from  Given the contract (∆), the expected utility of
a senior agent of ability  is
 + ∆ − ()2
where ()2 represents the cost of supplying effort . Under contract (∆), the senior
agent will select the effort that maximizes his expected utility, i.e.,
 = argmax
 { + b∆ − (b)2}.
Therefore, the level of effort is
 = 1
22∆.
The previous equation represents the Incentive Compatibility Constraint () of a senior
agent. The agent tends to exert a higher level of effort the lower his cost of supplying
effort (), the larger the bonus (∆) and the higher his skills ().
At any period , the expected profits of an active firm that runs its project with a
junior agent, to whom it pays the salary  , and with a senior agent of ability  through
a payment scheme (∆) are
 −  + (−∆)− 
Firms and workers in this market can sign either Short-term (ST) or Long-term (LT)
contracts. A ST contract between a firm and a junior agent consists of a salary  . An
ST contract with a senior agent is an incentive scheme (∆), that may be different
for agents with different abilities (and it can also depend on the value of the project in
case of success). This senior agent was working for some firm in period  − 1, but not
necessarily for the same firm with which he is signing the ST contract at period . An LT
contract between a firm and a junior agent at period  specifies the salary that the worker
will receive during the first period of the relationship and the incentive scheme that will
govern their relationship in period  + 1. The incentive scheme can be a function of the
revealed ability of the agent. That is, an LT contract is a vector (   ∆  ∆) and
it implies a commitment by the firm to keep the worker when senior, and a commitment
by the agent to work for the same firm at period + 1 independent of his ability.
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Each firm decides on the contracts it offers at each period and also on the type of
workers it hires. Therefore, an Outcome in the economy specifies, for each period , the
assignment of (some) junior and senior workers to firms and the contracts that govern
their relationship. Remember that a contract between a firm and a junior agent at period
 is signed at this period; it can be either an ST or an LT contract. On the other hand,
the contract governing the relationship between a senior worker and a firm at period 
can be either an ST contract signed at this period or an LT contract that was signed at
period − 1.
We look for equilibrium outcomes, that is, for outcomes that are immune to individual
deviations. The contract for an active worker (that is, any worker who signs a contract)
must be acceptable for him: he should be better off under the proposed outcome than if
he did not enter the relationship. That is, the contract must be individually rational for
the agent at the time he signs it. Once an agent has accepted a contract, he has to honor
it. Also, a firm should not have incentives to deviate from the proposed outcome. A firm
can deviate by changing the contract with its assigned workers or by contracting with
other agents.10 We assume that a firm can secure the services of a worker at period  if
he did not commit to an LT contract at period − 1 and it offers him a contract under
which he obtains the same level of utility (or a slightly higher level of utility) than in his
current situation. That is, the expected level of utility of a worker who is not committed
at period  is the “price” that a firm has to pay to attract him.
Hence, an Equilibrium in the economy is an outcome where:
) all active workers obtain, at least, their outside utility (i.e., junior workers achieve an
expected total utility of at least  +  and senior workers obtain at least  if they
sign a contract at this age);
) no firm would obtain higher expected intertemporal profits by changing the set of
proposed contracts by another set of contracts that guarantee to each worker at least the
same level of expected utility that he obtains under the current outcome.
We concentrate the analysis on stationary equilibria, that is, on equilibria where firms
follow the same strategy every period. For simplicity, we refer to stationary equilibria
simply as equilibria.
10For simplicity, we assume that all firms in
£¤ are active in this market. We return to this issue
at the end of Section 6.
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At equilibrium, a firm may
• offer LT contracts to junior workers (so that it keeps them when senior whatever
their type), or
• offer ST contracts to junior workers and to senior workers of high, or low, ability.
Therefore, at equilibrium the set of firms
£¤ is partitioned in three subsets, some
of which may be empty: the set R of firms that offer LT contracts, the set R of firms
that offer ST contracts to juniors and hire high-ability seniors and the set R of firms
that offer ST contracts to juniors and hire low-ability seniors. Obviously, the measures
of the sets R and R cannot be arbitrary as they must satisfy the feasibility constraint
that the ratio of the measures of R and R must be equal to the ratio of high- and
low-ability workers ( 
1− ).
We first note that when one considers the analysis of one isolated firm’s optimal
contract, ST contracts are always (at least weakly) dominated by LT contracts. We
do not prove this result since it is well-established in the literature that LT contracts
typically improve the efficiency of the relationships by allowing both parties to commit
on the sequence of events.11 The intuition is that the firm can always replicate in the LT
contract the optimal sequence of contingent ST contracts. Moreover, LT contracts are
typically superior because the firm, when it signs ST contracts, cannot commit to paying
the senior worker a utility level higher than his reservation utility. Therefore, if the firm
wants to keep the senior agent independently of his type, it would obtain higher profits by
signing an LT contract. In other words, we do not need to consider a fourth set of firms
-those that sign ST contracts and re-hire the same worker when senior independently of
his type- since this set is always empty at equilibrium.
Proposition 1 uses this idea to show a stronger result: in our environment, a situation
where all firms sign (optimal) LT contracts with their workers is an equilibrium.
11On the optimality of LT contracts versus ST contracts in a single principal-agent model with repeated
moral hazard, see, for instance, Lambert (1983), Rogerson (1985), Malcomson and Spinnewyn (1988),
and Chiappori et al. (1994). This literature analyzes the role of commitment, reputation, memory and
renegotiation. In our set-up the key element is the commitment. There is no role for memory since there
is no past outcome, and there is no role for reputation since all relevant parameters are public information
at any time.
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Proposition 1 There is always an equilibrium where all active firms sign LT contracts
with their workers.
If all the firms in the economy are signing LT contracts, then no single firm has
incentives to deviate and offer a sequence of ST contracts. What is the advantage of
committing to an LT relationship? As discussed above, the commitment allows the firm
to relax the limited liability constraint of senior workers by delaying part of their payments
as juniors. ST contracts typically cannot replicate this strategy. Indeed, when the firm
designs the ST agreement addressed to a senior agent, the contract that governed their
relationship the previous period, while he was young, is already sunk. Therefore, the firm
will only give the agent the rents that maximize its second-period profits.
The next sections explore equilibria where ST and LT contracts may coexist. We first
discuss how to analyze equilibrium contracts by using a firm’s one-period profits.
3 Equilibria and one-period profits
In an equilibrium, no firm can obtain higher expected intertemporal profits by changing
the set of proposed contracts. In this section, we relate this condition to the equilibrium
profits that one firm obtains (or it may obtain by changing the contract) in one period.
To illustrate the discussion, we take a firm offering an LT contract = (  ∆) 
with (∆) = ( ∆  ∆)  at each period that considers switching to a different
sequence of LT contracts  0 = (0  0∆0). If the firm decides at time  to change from
 to  0, then it still has to keep its commitment with the current senior worker who
it hired as junior at − 1. Therefore, the cost of the senior agent as well as the revenue it
receives at time  are the same under  0 and under  , because they are determined
by the realized quality of the senior agent. The only change at  concerns the payoff it
offers to the junior agent (0). The new contract  0 will be fully implemented from
+1 on (see Figure 1). Consequently, switching to  0 is not profitable for the firm if its
profits from + 1 on are not higher than under  , also taking into account the change
in the cost of the junior worker at  (i.e., the change from  to 0). This is equivalent
to comparing one-period profits under  and under  0 from the perspective of +1
but considering the present value of the cost of the junior agent incurred at the previous
period, that is, we have to impute a cost of 1 and 10 instead of  and 0 .
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Figure 1: A firm considers changing the contract
The situation is similar if a firm which is currently offering the contract  decides
to switch to a series of ST contracts: it first changes the contract it offers to the junior
agent to be able to fully implement the new strategy in the subsequent period. Also, we
face the same situation if a firm is currently offering ST contracts and plans to switch
to LT contracts: it needs to change the agreement with the junior agent today but still
needs to hire a senior agent through an ST contract to be able to fully implement the
change tomorrow. Finally, when a firm switches from ST contracts to another stream of
ST contracts in a period, it can do it immediately, without waiting till the subsequent
period. Indeed, it can keep hiring junior agents under the same conditions as before (that
is, under the lowest salary that the agent is ready to accept). Whether we compute the
cost of the junior agent as 1 or  is not relevant for the comparison of profits in
the two strategies, since the firm pays the same cost under both, the old and the new
contracts.
Therefore, we can develop the analysis of the (stationary) equilibria of our model by
focusing on the profits firms make in one period, provided that we consider the cost of the
junior agent as being generated the previous period, that is, as long as we associate a cost
of 1 , instead of  , to the junior agent. From now on, we will refer to this level of profits
as “a firm’s one-period profits” and we will denotee = − 1+(−∆)−. A firm
has incentives to switch from contract  to contract  0 if and only if e()  e( 0).
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4 Long-term contracts in equilibrium
Consider a firm that owns a project whose additional value in case of success is  ∈ £¤
and that signs LT contracts with junior workers. At each period , the firm runs the project
with the junior agent that it hires at  and with the senior worker that it hired at period
− 1. The senior agent has ability  with probability  and ability  with probability
1 − , as his ability was unknown at  − 1. As previously said, the ability of the agent
is publicly known before he starts working as a senior; hence, the LT contract signed at
− 1 may have payments contingent on the ability of the agent when senior.12
All workers are ex-ante identical and there are more junior workers than positions
to fill. Therefore, at any period there are unemployed junior agents ready to accept
any LT contract that provides them with an expected utility equal to their (two-period)
outside utility +. Hence, the participation constraint (PC ) specifies that the total
expected utility the worker obtains in the relationship be at least equal to  + .
Following the discussion of the previous section, a candidate LT contract for equi-
librium (   ∆  ∆) maximizes the firm’s one-period profits, also taking into
account the ICC s and the limited liability constraints (LLC ), that is, it solves
max
(  ∆ ∆)
 − 1 + ( (−∆)− ) + (1− )( (−∆)− )
s.t.  +  £(∆ +  − ()2) + (1− )(∆ +  − ()2)¤ ≥  + 
 = 1
22∆ ,  =
1
22∆
 ≥   ≥   ≥ .
If the contract does not satisfy the previous program, then the firm can deviate by offering
a different acceptable LT agreement to junior agents and obtain larger discounted profits.
We state the characteristics of the candidate LT contract in Proposition 2, where we
denote
e ≡ q2 + (1− ) 2,
1 ≡ 2e
r
1
 ( − ) +  −  and 

2 ≡ 4e
r
1
 ( − ) +  − .
12As will be clear later, this flexibility has no effect on the optimal contract. Therefore, at the candidate
equilibrium contract, no third party needs to verify the ability of the agent.
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Proposition 2 If firm  is in the set R , then it offers the following LT contract:
Region  : If   1 , then13
 () =
µ
 =  =  = 1 ( − ) +  −
1
42
2e2∆ = ∆ = ¶ 
Region  : If  ∈ £1  2 ¤  then
 () =
Ã
 =  =  = ∆ = ∆ = 2e
r
1
 ( − ) +  − 
!

Region  : If   2  then
 () =
µ
 =  =  = ∆ = ∆ = 2
¶

We now explain the main characteristics of the LT contract  (). Despite the ab-
sence of risk aversion, the moral hazard problem of the senior agent induces an inefficiency
due to the presence of limited liability that restricts the capacity of the firm to induce
the senior worker to exert a high effort. Therefore, the firm is interested in relaxing the
senior agent’s limited liability constraint, which explains why it concentrates as much as
possible the agent’s payments in his second period of life (i.e., the firm pays to a young
worker the minimum possible wage:  = .) Young agents accept contracts with a
low payoff because of the credible promise to be “well” paid when they are senior. The
limited liability constraints also explain why, unless  is very low, workers are paid the
minimum salary if the outcome turns out to be a failure:  =  = .
The impact of limited liability on bonuses and on payoffs obtained by agents and firms
differs depending on the profitability of the project  (as well as on the level of agents’
reservation utility  + , cost of effort , and “average” probability of success e).
Some characteristics are shown in Figure 2.
For high values of  (Region  ), the optimal bonus depends only on the value of
the project. The firm shares half of the value in the event of success because it maximizes
profits when the senior agent supplies effort  = 142 for  = . Given this bonus,
the worker ends up with a utility larger than  +  (i.e., he obtains informational
rents).
13In this region, there are other contracts that are also candidates for equilibrium. Any combination
of  ,  and  that satifies  +  ( + (1− )) +  1422e2 =  +  and such that each
variable is higher than , is also a candidate as it would give the same profits to the firm.
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Figure 2: Incentives in the optimal LT contracts
For intermediate values of  (Region  ), the equilibrium payment scheme also
depends on   ,  and , as the participation constraint (together with the lim-
ited liability constraint) binds. Given that the firm needs to provide a level of utility
of  + , it gives it in terms of bonuses, which lead to a senior agent’s effort of
 = 
q
1
 ( − ) +  −  for  = .
Finally, firms with low-valued projects (Region  ) give all the project’s returns to
the worker (they set ∆ = ) in exchange for a fixed payment (a franchise-type contract).
Therefore, agents obtain their total outside utility  +  and they provide, when
senior, the first-best level of effort  = 122 for  = .
Next corollary provides the expression of the firm’s one-period profits for  ().
Corollary 1 The firm’s one-period profits under  () are:
Region  : If   1 , then
e () =  − 1 −  + 1422e2
Region  : If  ∈ £1  2 ¤  then
e () =  + 1e
r
1
 ( − ) +  −  −
1
 [2 − (1 + )]− 2
Region  : If   2  then
e () =  + 2e2
82 −
(1 + )
 
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The profit function e () is continuously differentiable and convex in .
5 Short-term contracts in equilibrium
All firms signing ST contracts hire similar young workers, as they are indistinguishable
ex-ante. Concerning senior workers, they can decide to hire high-ability or low-ability
workers.
Consider an equilibrium where some firms sign ST contracts. A fraction of those
firms offer contracts to high-ability senior agents. Denote by  the (minimum) level of
utility that this type of agent obtains at the equilibrium.14 Similarly, denote by  the
(minimum) level of utility received by low-ability senior workers. Both  and  need to
be higher than or equal to  Additionally, given the limited liability constraint and the
competition among firms,  and, possibly,  can be strictly higher than  Therefore,
a junior agent is ready to sign an ST contract that provides a utility level lower than 
as long as the reduction is not higher than the expected extra utility he will obtain when
senior. Formally, the salary  that the junior agent is ready to accept must satisfy:
 +  [ + (1− )] ≥  + ,
where we denote  and  the expected utility of a high- and a low-ability worker. For
example, if all the low-ability workers obtain the same  in all the possible jobs, then
 = .
The candidate equilibrium contract of firm  in R (R) to a high- (low-) ability
senior agent must be the optimal one-period contract for this agent, taking into account
that it must grant him a level of utility of at least  (); that is, it solves
max
(∆)
 +  (−∆)− 
s.t. ∆ +  − ()2 ≥ 
 = 1
22∆
 ≥ 
14Given the limited liability constraint, similar senior agents might obtain different utility levels at
equilibrium. A firm with a very high  ends up providing its senior agent a utility level higher than  as
its participation constraint will not be binding (see also, Alonso-Pauli and Pérez-Castrillo, forthcoming).
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for  = . Next proposition provides the candidate equilibrium contract for those
firms, where we use the notation
1 () ≡ 2
p −  and 2 () ≡ 4p − .
Proposition 3 If firm  is in the set R with  ∈ {}, then it offers the following
ST contract to a senior agent:
Region  (): If   1 (), then
 () =
µ
 =  − 142
22 ∆ = 
¶

Region  (): If  ∈
£1 ()  2 ()¤  then
 () =
µ
 =  ∆ = 2
p − ¶ 
Region  (): If   2 ()  then
 () =
µ
 =  ∆ = 2
¶

In Region  (), senior agent’s effort is the first-best level  = 122 while in
Region  ()  his effort is lower than the first-best level:  = 1
√ −  In these two
regions, the agent’s expected utility is  Finally, in Region  () where the project is
very valuable, the senior agent’s effort is  = 142 for  =  and he receives an
informational rent. His expected utility in this region is  + 1
16222  
Corollary 2 provides the expression of the firm’s one-period profits under  (),
denoting  the equilibrium salary paid to junior agents.
Corollary 2 A firm  in the set R with  ∈ {} obtains the following one-period
profits with  ()
Region  (): If   1 (), then e ¡  ¢ =  + 14222 −  − 1 
Region  (): If  ∈
£1 ()  2 ()¤  then
e ¡  ¢ =  − 2 +  + 1√ −  − 1 
Region  (): If   2 ()  then e (  ) =  −  + 18222 − 1 
The profit function e ¡  ¢ is continuously differentiable and convex in .
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6 Equilibrium matching and equilibrium contracts
The previous sections identify the equilibrium contracts once we know the type of agree-
ments firms offer (that is, once the sets R , R and R are determined) and the levels
of utility  and  that they must guarantee to low- and high-ability agents. In the
present section, we characterize equilibria where at least some firms offer ST contracts.
Therefore, we identify the distribution of firms in R , R and R, the levels  and
 and the minimum salary  that firms must offer to juniors under ST contracts.
We look for equilibria where  = . Low-ability workers do not have special skills
and the firms will not compete for them.15 On the other hand, the level of  will be
determined by the equilibrium conditions, that is, by the (marginal) firm’s willingness
to pay to attract a high-ability worker instead of either attracting a low-ability one, or
signing an LT contract.
We develop the analysis for markets where high-ability workers are not abundant but
they make a difference for the firm they work for. That is, we consider environments with
many “normal” workers and some “stars”. Assumption 1 reflects this idea, together with
the reasonable hypothesis that the outside reservation utility of a senior agent is larger or
equal to that of a junior worker (part (i)). Assumption 1 (ii) states that the proportion of
high-ability agents is small enough. Finally, Assumption 1 (iii) reproduces the idea that
the difference among the two types of agent is large enough.
Assumption 1 The parameters satisfy the following conditions:
(i)  ≥  ,
(ii)   
1+2 ,
(iii)
³


´2  1 + 1 
Why may some firms be interested in LT relationships while others prefer to secure
high-ability agents through ST contracts? Even more, why would a firm choose a strategy
that implies contracting low-ability agents through ST contracts, instead of offering LT
contracts and, sometimes, benefiting from high-ability senior agents? The two main
equilibrium variables that make firms prefer one or another type of contract are the
15However, at equilibrium the measure of senior workers with low ability is the same as the measure of
firms looking for them. Therefore, other equilibria may exist where    for all low-ability players.
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salary of a young worker  (or rather, the comparison between  and ) and the
difference between the cost of a high- versus a low-ability senior agent, that is,  − 
The firms that obtain large profits in the event of success, that is, firms with a high ,
are ready to pay a high price to always hire a good senior agent given his added value in
terms of increased probability of success. Therefore, firms at the right end of the interval£¤ must be those most interested in signing ST contracts to hire high-ability senior
agents. Similarly, firms that do not care much about agents’ effort, i.e., firms with a low
, pay more attention to the potential savings they can make in a junior’s contract if
they offer him an ST contract than to the gains obtained through an LT contract, or
by securing a high-ability agent. Therefore, firms at the left end of
£¤ are the likely
candidates to sign ST contracts to hire low-ability senior agents.
Lemma 1 provides a first confirmation of the previous intuitions. It compares the
slopes, in terms of , of the profits obtained from the different types of contract.
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 1, the slopes of the profit functions satisfy the following
relations:16
(a) 
 (  )  

 (), for all  ;
(b) 
 (  )  
 (  ), for all  , and for all  ≥ ; and
(c)  ()  
 (  ), for all  , and for all  ≥ .
A firm’s ST profits increase with the value of success  when it hires a low-ability
worker. However, this increase is smaller than that of a firm’s profits under the optimal LT
contract (part (a)). It is also smaller than the rate at which its profits increase if it hires
high-ability workers through ST contracts (part (b)). A higher  implies a larger interest
in securing the services of a high-ability worker, which explains the previous relations. A
similar argument gives the intuition of part (c) in the lemma.
Let us denote by  the value that would “balance” the set of firms if all the firms
with    would hire low-ability workers while all the firms with  ≥  would hire
high-ability workers, that is,  is characterized by
()
1−() ≡
1− 
 
16Lemma 1 (a) and 1 (b) do not depend on Assumption 1. However, if Assumption 1 does not hold,
then Lemma 1 (c) may fail if    ≡
h 2+(1−)22 i £1 ( − ) +  − ¤+ .
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Also, we denote b the value that makes the firm indifferent between using LT contracts
and hiring low-ability senior workers through ST contracts, when the junior salary is
 = , that is, b is characterized by
e ( b) = e ( b ).
As we check in Claim 1 in the proof of Theorem 1, under Assumption 1 firm b lies in
regions  and  () Therefore, we can easily calculate b : b ≡ 2(2−2)p − .
We first consider the case where b ∈ [)  that is, some of the firms in the market
have a low-valued project, but there is a relatively high number of firms with valuable
projects.
Theorem 1 Suppose  ≤ b  , and denote  the firm such that ³ b´ =
(1− )(). Then, under Assumption 1, an equilibrium exists where
(i) firms with  ≤ b offer ST contracts:  to junior workers and  () to low-
ability senior workers,
(ii) firms with  ∈
³ b´ offer the LT contracts  (),
(iii) firms with  ≥  offer ST contracts:  to junior workers and  ( ) to
high-ability senior workers, where  is such that e () = e (   ),
(iv) junior workers accept both LT contracts that guarantee them  +  and ST con-
tracts with  = , and
(v) senior workers accept contracts that guarantee them .17
When  is high enough, that is, the population of firms is not concentrated on low
levels of  then, at equilibrium, firms are divided according to three hiring strategies.
Firms with low-valued projects use ST contracts and only hire low-ability seniors; firms
with a high  also use ST contracts but they only hire high-ability seniors; and firms with
intermediary s use LT contracts.
The rationale behind Theorem 1 is the following. Firms with more profitable projects
give more importance to hiring the high-ability worker, and they offer more to attract
them. This increases the expected utility of a junior worker when he accepts the ST
contract: if he turns out to be of high ability he will obtain a large utility level. The
17At equilibrium, high-ability workers receive a level of utility of, at least,    . However, out of
equilibrium, they should be ready to accept lower offers, as long as they guarantee  .
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Figure 3: Profit functions at equilibrium
expectation of this potential reward leads workers to accept a wage  =  when junior
which is under their reservation utility  because they will be compensated in the future
(in expected terms) for this sacrifice. Firms with low  take advantage of this reduction
in the wage that can be offered to junior workers who sign ST contracts: their value of
the project is low enough so that the reduction in the wage of junior agents more than
compensates the fact that they always end up hiring low-ability senior workers.
Given the difference in equilibrium salaries between high- and low-ability senior work-
ers, firms with intermediary  do not perceive a large difference between hiring one type
or another. Therefore, it is better for them to profit from the additional improvement in
efficiency due to the commitment they make through LT contracts.
Figure 3 draws the LT and ST profits, as a function of , for the equilibrium values
for salaries and utility  . As shown in Lemma 1, the slope of e (  ) is always
higher than that of e ()  which in turn is higher than the slope of e ().
At equilibrium, the market price that a firm has to pay in order to attract a high-ability
worker ( ), is such that the three profit functions cross as shown in Figure 3.
It is worth noting that even though all junior workers are identical when they sign their
equilibrium contracts and they perform identical jobs, their expected utility is different
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depending of the type of contract they are offered. Under an LT contract, a junior worker
expects a total utility of +. However, his expected utility if he signs an ST contract
with any firm is at least +  [ + (1− )], which is strictly higher than  + .
Therefore, workers that sign ST contracts end up receiving part of the surplus created by
the increase in efficiency induced by the optimal sorting of senior agents.
Next, we consider the case where  is small (the population of firms has a big con-
centration of firms with a low ).
Theorem 2 Suppose  ≤ b. Then, under Assumption 1, an equilibrium exists where
(i) firms with    offer ST contracts:  to junior workers and  () to low-
ability senior workers„
(ii) all firms with  ≥  offer ST contracts:  to junior workers and  () to
high-ability senior workers, where  ≡  +
¡
2
¢2
(2 − 2),
(iii) junior workers accept ST contracts with  = max{− ( + (1− ) − )  },
and
(iv) senior workers accept contracts that guarantee them .
The basic trade-offs between the several contractual forms a firm can choose from do
not depend on whether  is higher or lower than b. Therefore, the intuition behind The-
orem 2 is similar to the one behind Theorem 1. However, no firm is interested in offering
LT contracts when  ≤ b. ST contracts for low-ability agents provide higher profits
than LT contracts for any firm with  ≤ b while ST contracts with high-ability agents
are better than LT contracts for firms with  ≥  (given  and ). Therefore,
there is no space for the intermediate region where LT contracts are the best alternative.
Theorem 2 presents a situation where, at equilibrium, the market will only be formed
by firms offering ST contracts. When  ≤ b, most firms give low value to success since
most of them are below b. Therefore, they care more about decreasing the cost of junior
agents than about the additional incentives provided by LT contracts. In fact, firms with
a low  may benefit from the existence of firms with a high  in such a way that even the
marginal firm  may strictly prefer ST contracts (either with low- or with high-ability
workers) than LT contracts! This happens when    (and   ) in which case,
junior workers accept really low salaries because of the fact that they may migrate, when
senior, to a firm with a very high , which gives them high informational rents.
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Figure 4: Types of equilibria as a function of b
Finally, we consider the case where  is large (or b is small), that is, only firms with
high-valued projects are in the market.
Theorem 3 Suppose b  . Then, under Assumption 1, no equilibrium exists where
ST contracts are adopted.
When   b, all firms value their projects enough so that none is ready to offer ST
contracts to always keep low-ability workers. They would rather offer LT agreements,
which ensures them high-ability workers with some probability.
Figure 4 represents the three types of equilibrium configurations, obtained in theorems
1, 2 and 3, as a function of b and .
Is the market equilibrium efficient? In particular, is the assignment of firms to type
of contract efficient, or there would be a gain in efficiency by expanding, shrinking, or
changing the set of firms that offer ST agreements? It is easy to check that the equilibrium
highlighted in theorems 1 and 2 is strictly more efficient than that in Proposition 1. First,
firms that choose ST contracts could have chosen LT contracts, therefore their profits are
higher (they are strictly higher in the interior of the regions). Second, as we discussed
after Theorem 1, workers obtain higher expected utility under ST contracts. Therefore,
the use of ST contracts unambiguously leads to a Pareto improvement.
If the efficient assignment of firms to type of contract involves the use of ST contracts,
the set of firms will be divided in such a way that those with the lowest  sign ST
contracts with low-ability senior agents and firms with the highest  sign ST contracts
with high-ability senior agents. By arguments similar to those before, shrinking the set
of firms and workers that sign ST contracts at equilibrium cannot be beneficial: everyone
involved would lose. On the other hand, expanding the set of firms that use ST contracts at
equilibrium can improve efficiency. To see the reason, consider the case where b ∈ [),
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that is, the condition that leads to Theorem 1. If firms in the intervals
³ b b+ i and
[ − ) (where  and  are small and such that the proportion of firms in the
intervals is the same as the rate of low- versus high-ability seniors) switch to ST contracts,
then both marginally lose profits. However, the workers strictly obtain higher expected
utility. Therefore, the sum of profits and utility increases. This argument suggests that
firms have too much incentives, compared to the social optimum, to use LT contracts.
Assumption 1 is a sufficient condition that allows a precise separation of markets:
when there is a large concentration of firms with a low , then we should observe only
ST contracts while both LT and ST contracts coexist at equilibrium otherwise. However,
it is not a necessary condition.
An alternative scenario where Theorems 1 to 3 are easy to replicate is one where senior
agents are much more “important” than junior agents and, therefore, irrespective of their
ability they have more market value. In this case,  is much larger than  and/or the
discount rate  is high.18
Assumption 2 The parameters satisfy the following condition:
 ( − )
( − ) 
1
(2 − 2) max
½
1

2 1(1− )e2
¾
.
Theorem 4 shows that (Lemma 1 and) Theorems 1 to 3 indeed hold if we replace
Assumption 1 by Assumption 2.
Theorem 4 Suppose Assumption 2 holds. Then:
(A) if  ≤ b  , the strategies proposed in (i) to (v) from Theorem 1 constitute an
equilibrium;
(B) if  ≤ b, the strategies proposed in (i) to (iv) from Theorem 2 constitute an equi-
librium; and
(C) if b  , no equilibrium exists where ST contracts are used (as in Theorem 3).
18In a broad interpretation, the parameter  might also reflect the ratio of the length of the relationship
of a senior agent with the firm versus the length of the relationship of the junior agent. According to
this broad interpretation,  could be larger than 1. However, this would require adapting the model
to accomodate for firms with one junior and several senior agents of different cohorts or the other way
around.
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Our analysis allows us to predict the circumstances under which ST contracts are more
likely to emerge ( ≤ b) and those under which only ST contracts exist at equilibrium
( ≤ b). As to the distribution of firms, that affects  and  we should expect ST
contracts when there are some firms whose projects are not too profitable, so that they
are ready to hire through ST agreements to save on the juniors’ wage. Moreover, only
ST contracts appear at equilibrium when the firms are mostly concentrated on low levels
of . On the other hand, we should observe the coexistence of ST and LT contracts in
markets where  is high but, simultaneously,  is low enough. In this case, there is a
relevant fraction of firms with quite profitable projects (i.e., firms for which hiring a good
senior really makes a difference) and, simultaneously, there are firms that give little value
to the project.
For a given distribution of firms, the equilibrium includes ST contracts when b is
high enough. Next corollary identifies the characteristics of the parameters of the model
(affecting b) that make the presence of, at least, some firms with ST contracts more likely.
Corollary 3 The existence of short-term contracts at equilibrium is, ceteris paribus, more
likely,
(a) the lower is the difference between high- and low-ability seniors (2 − 2)
(b) the higher is the reservation utility of young workers () and the lower the minimum
wage (),
(c) the higher the discount rate (i.e., high ), and
(d) the more costly is the agents’ effort (low )
Remember that b is the value that makes the firm indifferent between using LT
contracts and ST agreements to hire a low-ability senior, when  = . Why does b
decrease when (2 − 2) increases? If (2 − 2) is larger, the optimal sorting between
senior workers and firms becomes more relevant, which would suggest that ST contracts
should prevail more often. However, this is not the case because the relevant question
is whether the firm ( b) that was indifferent between LT and ST contracts with low-
ability agents, prefers LT or ST contracts once (2 − 2) has increased. Given that
 = , an increase in (2 − 2) does not provide any additional saving in costs under
ST contracts, which is the reason for a firm to choose an ST strategy to hire low-ability
agents. However, it does increase the benefits accruing to those firms if they use LT
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contracts, as the difference between a high- and a low-ability agent is larger. Therefore,
increasing (2 − 2) provides additional incentives for a firm to prefer an LT contract to
an ST contract to hire low-ability agents and, as a consequence, LT contracts are more
likely.
A similar argument explains why ST contracts are more frequent when ( − ) is
higher: the benefits from ST agreements with low-ability agents decrease. Also, a lower
 implies that firms care more about today’s cost savings (through ST contracts) than
about future gains (from LT agreements); therefore, ST contracts are more profitable.
Finally, a higher  means that firms can make less profit out of the same workers, which
again favors the presence of ST contracts.
Note that, in general, we can not ensure the effect that an increase in the proportion of
high-ability seniors has on the emergence of ST contracting at equilibrium. The reason is
that, even if an increase in  reduces the value of b which favors the coexistence of short-
and long-term contracts, it also reduces the value of  which works in the opposite
direction. Therefore, unless we make an explicit assumption about the distribution of
firms in the  space ( ()), we cannot predict the exact effect of  on the market
outcome.
Finally, we briefly comment on the hypothesis concerning the set of active firms. We
have assumed that the set of firms active in the market is fixed and is measured by
the distribution function  () on the set £¤  Therefore, we have made the implicit
assumption that, irrespective of the market outcome, all firms find it worthwhile to stay
active in the market. This assumption can be sustained either because we consider that
the worst firm has a sufficiently profitable project (i.e.,  is high enough) or because the
fixed component of the firms’ activity ( ) is sufficiently high. However, in general, the
set of active firms is endogenous; it depends on the profitability of the market.
Suppose that the set of potential firms is distributed in the interval
£
0 ¤ according
to some distribution function () The set of active firms £¤ will be determined by
the condition that, at the market equilibrium, the profits of the firm  are zero and the
distribution () will be derived from (). The level of  will depend on the different
parameters of the model. We can discuss, for example, how changes in the parameter 
affect the set of active firms and the type of contracts signed in the market.
If  is very low, then the minimum  (and also ) is high. Therefore, b (which does
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not depend on the distribution of firms) is lower than  and, at equilibrium, only LT
contracts are signed. When  increases, both  and  increase until we reach the region
where ST contracts appear for low and high values of . Following the same logic as in
Figure 4 additional increases in  lead to larger regions with ST contracts, until only ST
contracts exist at equilibrium. Therefore, we should expect a prevalence of ST contracts
in those markets where the “fixed” component of the revenue (that is, the component
that does not depend on incentives) is large, while we should observe LT contracts in
those markets where most of the income comes from work subject to moral hazard. This,
in fact, reflects the main trade-off any firm faces. Focusing solely on incentives, LT
contracts are better as they can exploit the intertemporal nature of the relationship in
order to alleviate the moral hazard problem. On the other hand, ST contracts offer an
added flexibility that improves the efficiency of the firm/worker matching. If the market
characteristics are such that incentives play an important role in all firms’ profits, then
LT contracts prevail. However, if an appropriate worker selection is the key issue, then
ST contracts are used at equilibrium.
7 Conclusion
We have introduced and analyzed an equilibrium model to discuss advantages and disad-
vantages of short-term versus long-term contracts in a dynamic environment where senior
workers are subject to a moral hazard problem. On the one hand, long-term contracts
allow the better provision of incentives because firms can credibly transfer payments from
early to late periods in the life of the workers, and this transfer alleviates the incentive
compatibility constraint. On the other hand, short-term contracts allow the market to
ensure a better matching between agents’ ability and firms’ needs. Those agents that turn
out to have high ability can be hired by firms that can really profit from them.
We solve the model for markets where most workers have a standard ability but a
small proportion of them have high productivity; they are stars. Moreover, these stars
really make a difference in the firms they work for.
When firms operating very profitable projects19 identify very talented workers, they
are ready to offer very high salaries or bonuses to these stars. High-ability seniors end
19Projects where the incentives of the senior play an important role in firms’ profits.
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up receiving high remuneration when ST contract are in place which, in turn, allows the
reduction of the payment to juniors, who foresee the prospects of a very high wage when
seniors. Consequently, some firms having less lucrative ventures20 may not be able to
retain the high-talented workers, but they indirectly profit from the existence of such
workers as it allows them to hire juniors at a much lower cost.
At equilibrium, we often find that two types of firms use short-term contracts: firms
in which the success of the project depends very much on the senior’s effort, which always
end up hiring high-ability senior workers; and firms whose profits do not depend too
much on the effort, which hire low-ability senior workers. Intermediate firms may use
long-term or short-term contracts, depending on several market characteristics. We show
that coexistence of both types of contract is more likely when there is a relevant fraction
of firms with profitable projects, when the reservation utility of young workers is low and
the minimum wage is high, when the discount rate is small, when there is a large difference
between the productivity of high- and low-ability workers, and when the agents’ effort is
not too costly.
In addition to the equilibrium with short-term contracts that often exists, there always
exists an equilibrium where all firms choose a long-term contracts (see Proposition 1).
However, we argue that, in our environment, whenever the equilibrium with short-term
contracts and the one with only LT contracts coexist, the former is more “robust” or
“sensible” as the latter is a “knife-edge” result. The full long-term outcome is sustained
by the fact that, since no other firm is choosing a short-term contract, no firm can profit
from the enhanced flexibility that short-term contracts offer. A small amount of firms
with low-valued projects and another with high-valued projects have incentives to switch
from LT to ST agreements to obtain higher profits.
Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We first note that, in a situation where all firms sign LT contracts, if a firm
follows the strategy of offering ST contracts to its workers, it necessarily hires as senior
20Firms where the role of the senior is less important for the outcome.
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agent at period  the same agent that it hired as a junior at period − 1. Also, the only
alternative occupation for the senior agent is to get out of the market, since no other
firm is interested in hiring him, independent on his ability. Then, any sequence of ST
contracts can be replicated as an LT contract. Therefore, the optimal ST contracts cannot
give higher profits than the optimal LT contracts.
B Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Substituting  and  by their value and multiplying the objective function by
, the firm’s program can be rewritten as:
max
(  ∆ ∆)
 + 
µ
1
22
2∆ (−∆)− 
¶
+ (1− )
µ
1
22
2∆ (−∆)− 
¶
− 
s.t.  + 
µ
1
42
2∆2 + 
¶
+ (1− )
µ
1
22
2∆2 + 
¶
≥  +  (1)
 ≥   ≥   ≥ .
Let  ,  and  be the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the constraints. The
Kuhn-Tucker (first-order) conditions of the above maximization problem include the con-
straints, and the non-negativity of the multipliers:  ≥ 0,  ≥ 0,  ≥ 0,  ≥ 0 The
derivatives of the Lagrangian with respect to ∆ and ∆ are:
 1
22
2(− 2∆) +  122
2∆ = 0 (2)
 (1− ) 1
22
2(− 2∆) +  (1− ) 122
2∆ = 0 (3)
which imply that ∆ = ∆, which we denote ∆ in the rest of the proof.
The derivatives of the Lagrangian with respect to  ,  and  are:
−1 + +  = 0
− +  +  = 0 (4)
−(1− ) + (1− ) +  = 0
which imply  = 1− ,  =  (1− ) and  = (1− ) (1− ) ; therefore, either the
three constraints are binding or none is. The last Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:

∙
 + 
∙

µ
 + 1
42
2∆2
¶
+ (1− )
µ
 + 1
42
2∆2
¶¸
− ( + )
¸
= 0
33
 ( − ) = 0
 ( − ) = 0
 ( − ) = 0
From (2) and (4) we can deduce that:
 = 2− ∆ and  = 
µ
∆ − 1
¶

We study the different regions where the Kuhn-Tucker conditions may be satisfied:
Case /1:   0,   0,   0,   0 Payments when young and in case of failure are
 =  =  =  and the bonus in case of success is∆ = 2
q
1
 [( + )− (1 + )].
Finally, this is a candidate only if  ∈ [0 1], i.e.,
 ∈
"
2e
r
1
 [( + )− (1 + )]
4e
r
1
 [( + )− (1 + )]
#

Case 2 :  = 0   0   0,   0. Then  =  =  = , and ∆ = 2 . In
this case the participation constraint holds only if  ≥ 4
q
1
 [( + )− (1 + )]
(The candidate at the lower bound of this case coincides with the candidate at the higher
bound of Case 1.)
Case 3 :  =  =  = 0. Then  = 1 and ∆ = . We write the participation constraint
as
 +  ( + (1− )) +  1
42
2e2 =  + 
Any combination of  ,  and  that satisfies the previous constraint and such that the
three values are larger or equal to  constitutes an optimal solution (in particular, the val-
ues proposed in the proposition). This can be the case only if + ( + (1− )) ≥
(1 + ), that is  ≤ 2
q
1
 [( + )− (1 + )].
The unique candidate for each value of  is the optimal solution of the firm’s maxi-
mization program. From the optimal contract in each case, it is immediate to compute
agent’s effort(s) and utility, and firm’s profits. Additionally, easy calculations show that
the function  () is continuously differentiable in .
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C Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Substituting  by its value in the firm’s program, we can rewrite it as
max
(∆)
 + 1
22
2∆ (−∆)− 
s.t.
1
42
2∆2 +  ≥ 
 ≥ .
Let   be the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the constraints. The Kuhn-Tucker
(first-order) conditions of the above maximization problem include the constraints, and
the non-negativity of the multipliers:  ≥ 0,  ≥ 0 The derivatives of the Lagrangian
with respect to  and ∆ are
−1 + +  = 0 (5)
1
22
2 (− 2∆) +  122
2∆ = 0 (6)
From (5) and (6) we can deduce that:
 = 2− ∆ and  =

∆ − 1
We study the different regions.
Case /1:   0,   0 Payment are  =  and ∆ = 2
√ − . This is a candidate
only if  ≥ 0 and  ≥ 0, i.e.,  ∈
h
2

√ −  4
√ − 
i

Case 2 :  = 0   0. Then  = , and∆ = 2 . In this case the participation constraint
holds only if  ≥ 4
√ − 
Case 3 :  = 0. Then ∆ = , which implies  = 1  0. The participation constraint is
1
4222 +  =  Therefore,  =  − 14222 ≥  if and only if  ≤ 2
√ − 
The unique candidate for each value of is the optimal solution of the firm’s maximization
program. From the optimal contract in each case, it is immediate to compute agent’s
effort(s) and utility.
D Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. We highlight that the three derivatives that we consider in the lemma, 
 (  ),

 (), and 
 (  ), have a similar shape: they are first linear in  until they
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reach some 1 (either 1 (), or 1 , or 1 ()), then they are constant until they
reach a second threshold 2 and, from 2 on, they are linear in  again. The proof of
the three parts in the lemma is similar. We write a complete proof of part (a) and we
point out the main elements of parts (b) and (c).
(a) First, notice that if  lies in both regions  () and  , 
 =
1
222 
1
22 e2 =   The same comparison holds if  lies in both regions  () and
 . Additionally, if  lies in both regions  () and  , 
 =
1

p −  
1
eq1 ( − ) +  −  =  
Second, if 1 ≥ 1 () (and 2 ≥ 2 ()), then  is increasing in a
larger region of parameters than 
 before becoming constant (at a higher level than
 in region  ()). Finally, even if 
 starts increasing again (i.e., it reaches
region  ()) before  (because 2 () ≤ 2 ), it is always lower than the
latter, since it is lower even when  = 2 , given that we have seen that 
  


for any  which lies in both regions  () and  .
Third, suppose 1  1 () (and 2  2 ()). Given that 
 is smaller
than  when
 reaches the region where it becomes constant, and that it is
certainly also smaller when it starts increasing again (because  has reached this
region before), it is not possible that the two derivatives cross. Therefore, 
  


for any   0.
(b) If  lies in both regions  () and  (), 
 =
1
222  1222 =
  The same comparison holds in regions  () and  (). Also, if  lies in
both regions  () and  (), 
 =
1

p −   1√ −  =  
The rest of the proof is identical to the one in part (a).
(c) For  in both regions  and  () (and similarly in  and  ()),

 =
1
22 e2  1222 =  . If  lies in both regions  and  (),
then  =
1
eq1 ( − ) +  −   1√ −  =  if and only if  
2
2
£
1
 ( − ) +  − 
¤
+ . If this inequality holds, the rest of the proof of Lemma
(c) is identical to the one in part (a). A sufficient condition is
 ≥ e22
∙
1
 ( − ) +  − 
¸
+  (7)
which, given Assumption 1 (i), is implied by  (2 − e2)  e2, i.e., (1− ) (2 − 2) 
2+(1−)2, or, ((1− )− ) 
22  (1+)(1−) Assumption 1 (ii) implies that (1−
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)−  0Therefore, given Assumption 1 (iii), the inequality holds if ((1− )− )
³
1 + 1
´
≥
(1 + )(1− ), i.e., (1− )−  ≥ 0 which closes the proofs.
E Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. We do the proof through a series of claims.
Claim 1: If  = , then b  1 () and b  1 .
Proof of Claim 1: If the value b that satisfies e ( b) = e ( b) lies in both re-
gions  and  () (i.e., b  1 () and b  1 ), then b = 2(2−2)p − 
Moreover, it is easy to check that each of the inequalities b  1 () and b  1 is
equivalent to the following:
2 ( − )  
¡2 − 2¢ ( − )  (8)
Given Assumption 1 (i), (8) is implied by Assumption 1 (ii).
Claim 2: Consider the value b such thate ³ b ´ = e ³ b   = b´.
If junior workers anticipate that they will obtain at least b when senior if they turn out
to be high-ability, then they are ready to accept  = .
Proof of Claim 2: We proceed as follows. We conjecture that b is such that b 
1
³b´ = 2qb −  we will compute the corresponding b in this region, and
then we will show that it is indeed the case that b  1 ³b´. Therefore, b is defined
by
 − 1
 −  +
³
2
´2 b2 =  − 1 − b + ³2 ´2 b2
i.e., b = +¡ 12¢2 (2 − 2) b2 or b = + 1 ( − )  For this value, 1 ³b´ =
2

q
 +
¡
1
2
¢2
(2 − 2) b2 − . Therefore, b  1 ³b´ holds if and only if b2 ³
2

´2 h + ¡ 12¢2 (2 − 2) b2 − i, i.e., 2 b2  (2)2 ( − ), which is equivalent
to (8). Finally, given b , and taking into account that  ≥ b and  ≥ ,
a junior worker is ready to accept an ST contract with  whenever  +  +
 ¡ 1
2
¢2
(2 − 2) b2 ≥  + , that is, when  ≥ .
Claim 3: e ¡ = ¢  e ¡ = ¢ for any  ≥ b and
for any   b.
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Proof of Claim 3: Given the definition of b in Claim 3, e ³ b = ´ ≥
e ³ b = ´ for any  ≥ b . Then, the claim follows after Lemma 1 (b).
Claim 4: e ¡ = ¢  max©e ¡ =  ¢  e ()ª for
any   b.
Proof of Claim 4: The first inequality follows after Claim 3, also taking into account that
  b implies   b . The second inequality follows the definition of b and Lemma
1 (a).
Claim 5: e () ≥ max©e ¡ =  ¢  e ¡ = ¢ª for
any  ∈
h bi.
Proof of Claim 5: The first part of the inequality follows after the characterization of 
in part (vi) of the theorem, by the property that   b and Lemma 1 (c). The second
part follows the definition of b and Lemma 1 (a).
Claim 6: e ¡ =  ¢  max©e ()  e ¡ = ¢ª for
any   .
Proof of Claim 6: By the same argument as in Claim 5, the maximum of the two terms
inside the maximization is e (). Then, the inequality is implied by the characteri-
zation of  in part (vi) of the theorem, by the property that   b and Lemma 1
(c).
F Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Given that the behavior of the workers is optimal by construction, we prove the
theorem if we show that firms’ strategies are optimal. We do it through a series of claims.
Claim 1:  ≤  − 
¡
2
¢2
(2 − 2) 
Proof of Claim 1. Given that  ≥  and  ≥ ,  − ( + (1− ) − ) ≤
 − 
¡
2
¢2
(2 − 2)  Moreover  ≤  − 
¡
2
¢2
(2 − 2) because this inequality
is equivalent to  ≤ b.
Claim 2:  ≤ 1 () 
Proof of Claim 2:  ≤ 2
q
 +
¡
2
¢2
(2 − 2)−  if and only if  ≤ 2
p −  =
1 ()  which is implied by the fact that  ≤ b and b ≤ 1 () (by Claim 1 in
the proof of Theorem 1).
Claim 3: 
¡   ¢ =  ¡  ¢ ≥  () 
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Proof of Claim 3. Given that  ≤ 1 () and  ≤ 1 ()  the first equality comes
directly from the definition of   To prove the inequality, we notice that  ≤ 1 
because  ≤ b and b ≤ 1 (by Claim 1 in the proof of Theorem 1). Given that
 ≤ 1 and  ≤ 1 ()  the inequality can be written as − +
¡
2
¢2 ≥ −−
1
 ( − )+
³

2
´2  By Claim 1, a sufficient condition is −³ −  ¡2 ¢2 (2 − 2)´+¡
2
¢2 ≥ − − 1 ( − ) + ³ 2 ´2  This inequality holds because it is equivalent to
 ≤ b
Claim 4: e ¡ ¢  max©e (  )  e ()ª  for any   
Proof of Claim 4: It follows from Claim 3 and Lemma 1 (a) and (b).
Claim 5: e (  ) ≥ max©e ¡ ¢  e ()ª  for any  ≥ 
Proof of Claim 5: It follows from Claim 3 and Lemma 1 (b) and (c).
G Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. We recall that b is characterized by e ( b) = e ( b). If b  , thenb   for all  ∈ £¤. Therefore, Lemma 1 (b) implies e ()  e ()
for all  ∈ £¤. It easily follows that e ()  e (  ) for all  ∈ £¤,
 ≥  and  ≥ . Therefore, at equilibrium, no ST contract can be signed, since
it would imply that some firms choose the strategy of keeping low-ability senior workers,
which is dominated by the strategy of always offering LT contracts.
H Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. The proofs of theorems 1 and 2 and that of Lemma 1 only use Assumption 1 to
show that the inequalities (7) and (8) hold. Therefore, we prove theorem 4 if we show
that Assumption 2 also imply (7) and (8). We write Assumption 2 as
 ¡2 − 2¢ ( − )  2 ( − )
and
(1− ) ¡2 − 2¢ ( − )  e2 ( − ) .
The first inequality corresponds to (8). Moreover, it is easy to check that the second
inequality also corresponds to (7) (with strict inequality).
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